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While the conceptual importance of boards of directors in modern day businesses is 
undisputed, it is equally crucial to study the relationship between board of directors and 
board performance. The objective of this study is to examine the current literature and 
suggest that a better way to examine the role of board of directors is through a careful 
study on board structure, board processes and board performance, instead of focusing on 
board structure and firm performance alone. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Board research has traditionally centred on the relationship between board structure and 
firm performance. Empirical studies have however shown that the relationship is 
equivocal. In this paper, we propose that board process could be the missing link. We 
introduce an integrative conceptual model between board structure and board 
performance, with board process as an intervening variable. 
We based our definition of board structure on Tricker (1994). He noted that board 
structure distinguishes between those directors who hold management positions in the 
company and those who do not. Those with management positions are referred to as 
insider directors in the United States or executive directors in United Kingdom and 
Australia. The top person in the board is the chairman. He could be an executive or a 
non-executive of the company. If the CEO happens to be a director on the board, then he 
is an executive director. Zahra and Pearce (1989) identified other dimensions of board 
structure, such as the number and types of board committees, committee membership, 
flow of information among these committees and patterns of committee membership. In 
this paper, we concentrate only on CEO-chairman duality and insider-outsider 
directorships as they are widely covered in board research (see Dalton & Daily 1999; 
Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). 
Board processes refer mainly to the decision-making activities of directors of companies. 
We identified four process variables, based largely on existing research on group and top 
management team (TMT) studies (Amason & Sapienza, 1997: Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). They are effort norms, conflict, presence/use of 
knowledge/skills and cohesiveness. 
We define board performance as the ability of the directors in executing their roles. We 
identify three main roles that merit careful investigation: monitoring, service and strategic 
planning (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; Ong & Lee, 2000). 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Firstly, we present the "why" to study board process 
as the intervening variable between board structure and board performance. For this, we 
review past studies on board research. This helps us to identify existing research gap and 
hence the need to study beyond current focus on board research. We will highlight the 
present status of theoretical analysis on board process and performance, illustrating in 
particular the lack of empirical studies in this area. The need for new areas of board 
research and a better theoretical framework lead us to the "how" question. We will 
introduce a new conceptual model of board processes and performance. In the concluding 
section, we will highlight the uniqueness and potential contributions of undertaking such 
a study, based on the suggested model. 
  
WHY THE NEED TO STUDY BOARD PROCESSES AS AN INTERVENING 
VARIABLE BETWEEN BOARD STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
To date, the relationship between board structure (as opposed to board processes) and 
company performance has been the most-studied aspect among all board investigations 
(Bhagat & Black, 1999). In these studies, it is often assumed that a company's financial 
performance is mainly determined by board characteristics. Pfeffer (1983) argued that it 
is not necessary to understand board processes as directors' performance can be inferred 
from their demographic characteristics. To a large extent, such a justification is 
parsimonious: if one can show that board structure leads to company performance, it is 
not required to explain how/why board operates in certain ways. This analysis is very 
appealing, as quantification of board structure and company performance is much easier 
than that of incorporating board processes and board performance. 
Two areas of board research which have made use of the above assumption are CEO-
chairman duality and insider/outsider directors (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Under CEO-
chairman duality, the CEO of a company plays the dual role of chairman of the board of 
directors. Several researchers argue that CEO-chairman duality is detrimental to 
companies as the same person will be marking his "own examination papers". Separation 
of duties will lead to (1) avoidance of CEO entrenchment; (2) increase of board 
monitoring effectiveness; (3) availability of board chairman to advise the CEO and (4) 
establishment of independence between board of directors and corporate management 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). 
On the other hand, other researchers believe that since the CEO and chairman are the 
same person, the company will (1) achieve strong, unambiguous leadership; (2) achieve 
internal efficiencies through unity of command; (3) eliminate potential for conflict 
between CEO and board chair and (4) avoid confusion of having two public 
spokespersons addressing firm stakeholders (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
A closer look at the empirical evidence reveals that the relationship between CEO-
chairman duality and company performance is mixed and inconclusive. See Table 1 for a 
list of some of these studies. 
  
Table 1 
Relationship between CEO-Chairman Duality and Company Performance 
Study 
(Year) Dimension 
Performance 
Indicators Sample Major Findings 
1. Berg & 
Smith 
(1978) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
Change in 
value of 
common stock 
Dividend 
growth  
Stock price 
growth  
ROI 
Fortune 200 firms 
Independant CEO-
chairman was 
positively related with 
ROI  
No relationship with 
other indicators 
2. Chaganti 
et al. (1985) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
Firm 
bankruptcy 
21 pairs 
(successful/failing) 
of retail firms 
No relationship with 
financial performance
3. Rechner 
& Dalton 
(1991) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
ROE  
ROI  
Profit margin 
250 Fortune 500 
firms 
Independant CEO-
chairman was 
positively related with 
financial performance
4. 
Donaldson 
& Davis 
(1991) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
ROE 337 U.S. firms from S&P  
Dual CEO-chairman 
was positively related 
with financial 
performance 
5. Daily & 
Dalton 
(1992) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
ROA  
ROE  
P/E ratio 
Inc. 100 firms No relationship with financial performance
6. Daily & 
Dalton 
(1993) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
ROA  
ROE  
P/E ratio 
186 small firms No relationship with financial performance
7. Daily & 
Dalton 
(1994) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
ROA 183 Inc. firms and small corporations 
Independant CEO-
chairman was 
positively related with 
financial performance
8. Daily & 
Dalton 
(1995) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
Firm 
bankruptcy 214 firms 
Independant CEO-
chairman was 
positively related with 
bankruptcy 
9. Boyd 
(1995) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
ROI 192 U.S. firms 
Dual CEO-chairman 
was positively related 
with financial 
performance in high 
complexity 
environments 
Ong (1999) 
CEO-
chairman 
duality 
Sales  
Net profit 
before tax 
ROI  
ROS 
377 Singapore firms No relationship with financial performance
  
The second most-studied dimension of board structure is the proposition of outside-inside 
directors. Outside directors are those directors who are not members of the corporate 
management. Some researchers argue that outsiders are likely to show more objectivity in 
their deliberations and are willing to consider diverse groups in making their decisions 
(Jones & Goldberg, 1982; Spencer, 1983). Other theorists in contrast noted that outside 
directors do not have the requisite time and expertise to do their job well. Some claim 
that since outside directors are chosen and retained by the CEO, they function and rely 
heavily on information provided by the CEO (Geneen, 1984; Vance, 1983). 
A list of key studies which relates outside-insider directors to company performance is 
shown in Table 2. Again, the conclusions are equivocal. 
  
Table 2 
Relationship between Inside-Outside Directors and Company Performance 
Study 
(Year) Dimension 
Performance
Indicators Sample Major Findings 
1. Vance 
(1995) 
Insiders vs 
Outsiders 
Net income  
Sales  
Owners' 
equity 
200 major 
manufacturing firms 
(1925-1950) 
Insiders' 
representation was 
positively 
associated with 
financial 
performance 
2. Vance 
(1995) 
Insiders vs 
duality 
Net income  
Sales  
Owners' 
equity 
103 major industrial 
firms (1925-1963) 
Insiders were 
conducive to 
effective financial 
performance 
3. Schmidt 
(1975) 
Insiders vs 
duality 
Long-term 
debt  
Dividends  
Current ratio 
80 chemical 
companies (1962-
1963) 
No relationship with 
financial 
performance 
4. Cochran 
et al. 
(1985) 
Insiders' 
representation 
Operating 
income  
Sales  
ROE  
ROA  
Excess value 
ratio 
406 Fortune 500 in 
1982 
Insiders' ratio was 
positively 
associated with 
financial 
performance 
5. 
Baysinger 
& Butler 
(1985) 
Outsiders ROE 
266 major 
corporations in 1970 
and 1980 
Companies 
achieved higher 
performance did so 
without having a 
majority of 
outsiders 
6. Caganti 
et al. 
(1985) 
Outsiders Firm bankruptcy 
21 pairs 
(successful/failing) of 
retail firms 
No relationship with 
financial 
performance 
7. Kesner 
(1987) 
Proportion of 
insiders on 
board 
Profit margin 
ROE  
ROA  
EPS  
Stock price 
250 of 1983 Fortune 
500 companies in 27 
industries 
No relationship with 
financial 
performance 
8. Zahra & 
Stanton 
(1988) 
Outsiders' ratio 
ROE  
Profit margin 
on sales  
EPS  
DPS 
100 Fortune 500 
1980-1983 
Outsiders' ratio was 
not associated with 
financial 
performance 
9. Agrawal 
& Knoeber 
(1996) 
Outsiders Performance index 
400 large Forbes 800, 
1987 
Negative 
relationship 
between number of 
outside directors 
and financial 
performance 
  
Various reasons have been put forth for the mixed relationship between board structure 
and board performance (for review, see Heracleous, 2001). Firstly, there is no consensus 
as to which structure leads to what level of performance (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 
1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Dalton and Daily (1999) noted that in spite of several 
decades of research designed to link the relationship between board structure and 
company performance, results have been described as "vexing", "contradictory", "mixed" 
and "inconsistent". A meta-analysis of more than 40 years of data from 159 studies by 
these two researchers concluded that there is no evidence of a substantive relationship 
between board structure and financial performance, regardless of the type of performance 
measures, size of firm or the manner board composition is defined. Dalton and Daily also 
queried why there should be a relationship between board structure and firm performance 
in the first place. For example, they noted that while board independence is a legitimate 
concern, it should not be the only concern. Adding further, a board could be completely 
independent and at the same time, does badly in its expertise/counsel and service roles. 
Alternatively, in a board with a majority of inside directors, the directors may fail in its 
control and monitoring roles. 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) also shared the above sentiments. They argued that 
the relationship between board structure and financial performance might not exist at all. 
Or, if there is a relationship, their magnitude may not be of practical significance. Kesner 
and Johnson (1990) suggested that under normal circumstances, the board is probably not 
an important, direct determinant of firm performance. The reason is that boards are not 
involved in daily decision-making. 
To other researchers, board structure is as important as board process. Phan (1998) noted 
that having simply a structure is not sufficient. The right processes must be in place to 
support the structure. Analogously, Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) argued that the 
performance of any group/team is as much a function of its structure and process. If a 
group/team does not work well, one must analyze the status, power, liking, role and 
communication structures. If the structure is in place, one must examine which roles are 
performed and not performed, and how these decisions are made. The process of team-
building involves intact company teams to diagnose and correct the shortcomings. 
The reason for the lack of direct relationship between board structure and firm 
performance is due to the intervening board process. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
noted that a reason why board structure is unlikely to have universal impact on firm 
performance is that there are too many intervening processes to expect a strong direct 
association. As a result, the impact of board structure on firm performance may not be a 
one-to-one effect. Board structure may not be an important variable so long as the board 
performs well through cooperation, debate and discussion. Echoing the same views is 
Heracleous (1999, 2001). He noted that the mixed results could be due to both 
methodological and conceptual issues, such as lack of attention to group dynamics, high 
complexity of processes, variations in measurements of board attributes and performance. 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) concluded that since there is little consistency 
between board structure and firm performance, researchers should inspect the process by 
which boards may affect company results instead. 
In sum, we need to study beyond previous board research which centres around board 
structure and firm performance. Many researchers have called for a close examination on 
the various intervening board processes and their effect on a board's ability to perform its 
roles. 
  
HOW TO STUDY BOARD PROCESSES AS AN INTERVENING VARIABLE 
BETWEEN BOARD STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
We will now propose the conceptual model for the study of the inter-relationship among 
board structure, board processes and performance. 
In this section, we will firstly explain the structure of our integrative model. Next, we will 
define and operationalize the various variables, and put forth the propositions. 
  
Structure of Model 
Briefly, our framework suggests a direct relationship between (1) board structure and 
board processes and (2) board processes and board performance. Board process is 
hypothesized as an intervening variable between structure and performance, following 
the arguments by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Buchanan, and Huczynski 
(1997). Distinctive features of our model are as follows: 
Firstly, despite the unequivocal findings between board structure and firm performance, 
we take the view that board structure remains an important variable to study in any 
serious board research. 
Secondly, instead of studying all aspects of board structure, we concentrate on two areas 
which have been extensively examined: (1) CEO-chairman duality and (2) 
insider/outsider directors (see Dalton & Daily 1999; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Thirdly, cohesiveness has also been proposed as a criterion of performance instead of 
process (Cartwright, 1980). For this study, we will treat cohesiveness as part of board 
processes, similar to arguments put forth by Guth and MacMillan, (1986), and Isbella & 
Waddock (1994). 
Finally, for board performance, we concentrate on three main roles of directors: 
monitoring, service and strategy (Ong & Lee, 2000). 
It is also important to point out that we have deliberately left out firm performance in this 
model. Firm performance is dependent on many factors. In a meta-analysis of firm 
performance by Capon, Farley and Hoenig (1990) using 320 published studies that 
attempted to relate environmental, strategic, and organizational factors to financial 
performance, only R&D was found to explain more than 10 per cent of the variance in 
financial performance (10.7 per cent). At the same time, while it is possible to equate 
board performance with firm performance, we do not take this approach. As noted by 
Frankforter, Berman and Jones (2000), studies that equate board performance and 
financial performance is a dubious assumption for a number of reasons. Kosnik (1987), 
for example, points out that a firm's financial performance is likely to be affected by a 
"multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors" which make isolation of board factors 
extremely difficult (p. 163). Further, as Mace (1986), and Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
make clear, boards are not well positioned to oversee the day-to-day financial affairs of 
the firm. 
  
Definition and Research Measurements 
Board structure. As noted above, we propose to study 2 items of board structure. CEO-
chairman duality is coded as a dichotomous variable. If the CEO of the company is also 
the chairman of the board, the variable is coded as 1 and as 0 otherwise. As for the 
second measure of the proportion of outside directors, the figure is the divisor of the 
number of outside directors and the total number of directors for each company. The 
theoretical range for this variable is 0-1. Both variables are obtained from the annual 
report of each listed company. 
Board processes. In general, board process refers mainly to the decision-making 
activities of the board (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Anderson and Anthony (1988) noted that 
board process pertains to the healthy and sometimes rigorous discussion on corporate 
issues and problems so that decisions can be reached and supported. Dulewicz, 
MacMillan and Herbert (1995) denoted board process as the organizing and running of 
board which need to be performed so that the objectives of the board can be achieved. 
We identified four process variables, based largely on existing research on group and 
TMT studies (Amason & Sapienza, 1997: Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jehn & Mannix, 
2001). They are effort norms, conflict, presence/use of knowledge/skills and 
cohesiveness. 
Board processes which have been identified as affecting board performance include (1) 
effort norms; (2) conflict; (3) presence/use of knowledge & skills and (4) cohesiveness 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997: Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). Shaw 
and Power (1998) argued that for a group to perform successfully, the team must be a 
cohesive unit with the necessary knowledge and skills to manage conflict that happens so 
as to establish acceptable norms for problem-solving and decision-making. 
(A) Effort norms. According to Wageman (1995), effort norms are the shared beliefs of 
groups for the performance of a task. Effort, on its own, is an outcome of motivation and 
represents the vigor of individual's behaviour or total cognitive behaviour that one gives 
to the target task (Kanfer, 1992). Norms identify ways to channel this effort for the group 
task (Goodman, 1986). In essence, norms represent a set of expected behaviours. 
Secondly, these expectations are held and accepted by group members. Thirdly, group 
members will enforce the performance of the expected behaviours. Adding further, 
Goodman noted that norms are different from values, which are more general. Some 
norms emphasize on a particular situation and how the incumbent of that position should 
behave. Norms denote standards of behaviour for groups and larger social systems. 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) noted that directors who put in sufficient time for their duties 
and sought out relevant information perform better. It is because the most cited problem 
which directors face is lack of time to carry out their duties (Lorsch, 1997). 
However, other researchers argued that time is not the only manifestation of effort. 
Jensen (1993) noted that time spent on meetings are not unnecessarily useful as CEOs 
almost always set the agenda. Herman (1981) and Mace (1986) also cited empirical 
evidence that there are boards which go through the motions of attending meetings and 
registering votes, without careful consideration of issues facing the board. In a recent 
study involving 307 U.S. firms from 1990 to 1994, Vafeas (1999) found that the annual 
number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value. This conclusion supports the 
proposition that monitoring of managers (equivalent to more meetings) becomes more 
intense after periods of poor performance. 
We can measure effort norms by three different variables. First is the number of board 
meetings within a year. This information is available from the annual reports of listed 
companies. The second variable is the average amount of time per meeting, captured 
from questionnaire survey. The third variable pertains to qualitative statements on effort 
norms. We took four statements adapted from Wageman (1995), which are also proposed 
by Forbes and Milliken (1999). The statements include whether board members (1) 
perform careful evaluation of information prior to meetings and (2) conduct frequent 
research for companies. We proposed to add four items from the work by Shanley and 
Langfred (1998). Examples of these statements are (1) the amount of effort board 
members put into the work and (2) the degree of positive attitude towards work load. All 
qualitative statements are measured on a 5-item Likert-scale ranging from "Not all all" to 
"A great deal". Greater scores mean higher level of effort norms. 
(B) Conflict. Jehn & Mannix (2001) argued that there are three types of conflicts that 
occur in a group which will affect group performance. They are (1) conflictive conflict; 
(2) affective conflict and (3) process conflict. The first type pertains to the discord 
relating to the performance of tasks due to different viewpoints, ideas and opinions. 
Dutton and Jackson (1987) reasoned that the disagreement arose because issues facing 
boards are generally complex and ambiguous. However, cognitive conflict is by no 
means bad. Amason (1996) heeded that critical analysis and discussion during meetings 
promote the performance of a director's control role. In such situations, CEOs/top 
managers may be required to take a double-look at company's strategies through 
modification or improvement. More importantly, the presence of cognitive conflict 
among directors serves as a reminder to management about the power of the board, that 
is, boards will not be simply "rubber stampers". 
On the other hand, excessive cognitive conflict is dysfunctional. Nemeth and Staw (1989) 
cautioned the arousal of negative emotions and Jehn (1995) noted lower level of 
satisfaction. When that occur, conflict becomes personal in nature - and hence the term 
affective conflict. Such conflict involves personal issues such as annoyance, frustration, 
and irritation. 
Recent studies have identified a third unique type of conflict, known as process conflict 
(Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999). Process conflict is the awareness of controversies 
about aspects of how task accomplishment will proceed. More specifically, process 
conflict pertains to issues of duty and resource delegation, such as who should do what 
and how much responsibility different people should get. For instance, when group 
members disagree about whose responsibility it is to complete a specific duty, they are 
experiencing process conflict. 
Empirical evidence on conflict covered in Jehn and Mannix (2001)'s research showed 
that moderate level of cognitive conflict has been beneficial to group performance on 
certain types of tasks (Jehn & Shah, 1997). Teams benefit from differences of opinion 
about the work being done and about ideas (Bourgeois, 1985; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Jehn, 1995). Cognitive conflict improves decision quality because 
the synthesis that emerges from the conflict is generally superior to the individual 
perspectives themselves (Schweiger & Sandberg, 1989; Schwenk, 1990). 
As for affective conflict, studies have shown that it is detrimental to individual and group 
performance, member satisfaction, and the likelihood a group will work together in the 
future (Jehn, 1995; Shah & Jehn, 1993). Research findings indicate that the anxiety 
produced by interpersonal animosity may inhibit cognitive functioning (Roseman, Wiest 
& Swartz, 1994; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) and also distract team members from 
task, causing them to work less effectively and produce suboptimal products (Kelly, 
1979; Wilson et al., 1986). 
In contrast, there are few empirical studies on process conflict. In one of them, Jehn 
(1992) found that process conflict was associated with a lower level of group morale and 
decreased productivity. This is because when a group quarrels about who does what, 
members are dissatisfied with the uncertainty and have a stronger want of leaving the 
group. Moreover, Jehn (1997) found that process conflicts meddle with task content 
quality and often make members deal with irrelevant discussions. In a more recent study, 
Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) found that group members who continue to debate 
about task assignments were unable to do their work effectively. 
With regard to measurement scales, we could obtain six items to measure cognitive 
conflict from Smith et al. (1994), Jehn (1995) and Charan (1998). Statements include 
whether (1) board considers viewpoints of different members before making final 
decision; (2) decisions are settled amicably and (3) discussions are open and candid. The 
measurements are on a 5-item Likert-scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly 
agree". Higher scores represent higher level of cognitive conflict. 
Measurements for affective conflict can be based on research by Smith et al. (1994). Five 
items, on a Likert-scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree", are adapted. 
Examples are whether (1) there is personality clashes among directors; (2) members do 
not get along very well and (3) relationships among members are best described as "win-
lose", that is, if he/she wins, I lose. Higher scores represent higher level of affective 
conflict. 
On process conflict, four items can be taken from studies by Shah and Jehn (1993), and 
Jehn & Mannix (2001). These statements include whether (1) board members tend to 
argue on the way things are done; (2) board members often differ about the resource 
allocation for work and (3) there are frequent arguments about who should do what in 
this board. Like the first two types of conflicts, process conflict can be measured on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". Greater scores 
mean higher level of affective conflict. 
(C)Presence and use of knowledge and skills. For boards to perform effectively, Ancona 
and Caldwell (1988) argued that directors must possess functional knowledge and skills 
with external networks for information gathering and problem solving. Nonaka (1994) 
added that it is also necessary for directors to have firm-specific knowledge and skills so 
as to make informed decisions. In a survey involving 339 chairmen, CEOs and other 
directors of U.K. companies, Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995) identified 37 
skills required of directors. The researchers further divided the required competencies 
into 6 groups. Carlson (1998) added that directors could benefit from each other's 
knowledge and experience. It aids in reducing mistrust that might initially exist when 
individuals do not know each other well or have not worked together. 
In our review, we find that measurement for the use of knowledge and skills can be 
adapted from the scale developed by Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995). 
Statements include whether board members adopt/use: (1) strategic perception; (2) 
analytical thinking and (3) result-oriented perspective. They can be measured on a Likert 
scale ranging from "Very low" to "Very high". Higher scores represent higher level of 
presence/use of knowledge and skills. 
(D) Cohesiveness. On the fourth dimension of board processes, Summers, Coffelt and 
Horton (1988) labeled cohesiveness as the extent to which directors are attracted to each 
other and motivated to stay with the board. Weick (1979) noted that as boards met only 
periodically due to the part-time status, the relationship among directors is one of partial 
inclusion. Furthermore, Park (1995) argued the part-time involvement of directors is a 
cause for ineffective board performance. Cohesiveness thus encompasses the affective 
relationship of directors and represents their ability to stay and work together. 
O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989) argued that the impact of cohesiveness on strategic 
decisions has two aspects: generation and implementation. Generation is negatively 
associated with social integration and consensus in groups. Such groups value 
cooperation, are more cohesive and more motivated to maintain cordial relations. 
Consequently, this leads to higher pressure for conformity, limiting the quality of both 
alternative generation and evaluation of decisions. They put forth the notion that the 
effectiveness of strategic decision roles is positively related to social integration and 
consensus. Within such groups, there exists high level of cooperation, frequent 
communication and group identification, all of which will enhance the implementation of 
decisions (Guth & MacMillan, 1986). Furthermore, consensus can create more feelings of 
satisfaction with the decision-making process, giving rise to greater decision acceptance 
and commitment (Isbella & Waddock, 1994). 
Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) argued that increased size can significantly reduce 
cohesiveness among board members. Large boards may encounter more hindrances for a 
consensus on decisions. Shaw (1981) for example reasoned that directors might 
experience lower levels of motivation and satisfaction with the lack of participation 
characterizing large work-groups. Gladstein (1984) added that larger teams may be more 
difficult to coordinate due to the large number of potential interactions among members. 
We can adopt Shanley and Langfred (1998)'s indicators on group cohesiveness for use. 
Examples of these statements identify the extent to which (1) the board obtains feedback 
from the directors for decision-making; (2) the board gets help from the directors for 
decision-making and (3) co-operativeness of directors is present. These measurements 
can be on a 5-point Likert scale from "Very low" to "Very high". Greater scores hence 
represent higher level of cohesiveness. 
Board performance. O'Neal and Thomas (1996) noted that board performance is seldom 
evaluated. In a study involving personal interviews with 80 CEOs and corporate directors 
of some 40 companies in 23 industries in the United States, they found the assessment of 
board performance as a unit seems more ambiguous than that for evaluating directors. 
While there are various definitions of group effectiveness (Goodman, 1986), board 
performance has been measured along the dimension of board's ability to perform its 
functions (Lorsch, 1997). Koontz (1967) remarked that an effective performance is 
equated to clarification and execution of the main responsibilities and duties of directors. 
Tricker (1994) noted that for a board to be effective, it must achieve its roles to ensure 
continuing success of an enterprise. Similarly, Cornforth (2001) noted that given the 
difficulty of defining common goals for boards, the most common approach has been to 
identify various board functions and how well these functions are being performed. 
Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995) noted that there are four main areas which 
boards should see as their prime responsibility. They are: (1) vision, mission and values; 
(2) strategy and structure; (3) delegation to management and (4) responsibility to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Tecker and Fidler (1993) found that a notable 
characteristic of effective boards is the ability to fulfill the assigned task, that is, where 
the organization is going and how it is going to reach there. Hilmer and Tricker (1990) 
advised that a board's effectiveness can be hindered if the important distinctions between 
conformance and performance roles of boards are not properly understood and the board 
role, vis-à-vis that of management, is not clearly defined. 
With regard to specific roles, we will concentrate on monitoring, service and strategy. As 
argued by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), these three roles capture directors' most 
significant duties and functions. 
(A) Monitoring. This refers to aspects such as how CEOs are chosen and rewarded; 
evaluation of CEOs and company performance and how shareholders' wealth can be 
maximized. Westphal (1999) and Blake (1999) proposed the following areas be 
investiagted: the extent to which (1) board monitors top management strategic decision 
making; (2) board formally evaluate the performance of top company executives; (3) 
board defer to the judgment of top managers on final strategic decisions; (4) board 
developed performance objectives; (5) board required information showing progress 
against corporate objectives; (6) board analyzed financial information for important 
issues and trends; (7) board analyzed budget allocation against performance and (8) board 
reviewed company performance against strategic plan. Higher scores represent higher 
degree of monitoring by board. In addition, we can measure these statements on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". 
(B) Service. Westphal (1999) and Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995) have 
identified the following aspects to be studied: the degree to which (1) top managers 
solicit board assistance in the formulation of corporate strategy; (2) outside directors 
perform a task of a "sounding board" on strategic issues and (3) directors provide advice 
and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee meetings; (4) board takes into 
account the legitimate interests of organizations, groups and individuals (stakeholders) 
who have a direct interest in the achievement of company objectives; (5) board ensures 
the communications with stakeholders and the general public are effective and (6) board 
promotes the goodwill and support of relevant stakeholders. Again, these statements can 
be measured on a Likert-scale with 1 as "Strongly disagree" to 5 as "Strongly agree". 
(C) Strategy. Following the arguments by Fama and Jensen (1983), and Tricker (1994), 
we concentrate on the strategy function of board in terms of direction and planning. 
Areas to be examined come from two sources: Zahra (1990) and Blake (1999). Items 
selected iclude the magnitude by which (1) board articulates a company mission; (2) 
board conducts internal analysis; (3) board practises external analysis; (4) board identifies 
strategic plan; (5) develops strategic options and selects a final strategy; (5) board are 
involved in strategic planning process; (6) board communicates the company's strategic 
direction throughout the company; (7) receives plans for the implementation of strategy 
from the CEO and (8) board benchmarks the strategic plan with industry comparative 
data. Like the measurement for the above two functions, statements on strategy can be 
measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1 as "Strongly disagree" to 5 as 
"Strongly agree". 
Before moving onto the next sub-section of the propositions, we will like to cover briefly 
the data collection methods for the variables. To obtain data on CEO-chairman duality 
and proportion of outsiders, we can use the annual reports of companies. For data to 
represent variables of board processes and performance, a questionnaire survey is 
recommended. To reduce the possibility of common method variance, multiple 
respondents will be used for the data collection (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The 
questionnaire can be sent to different persons of each company - the chairman of the 
board, an inside director, an outside director and the CEO (if he is not the chairman). We 
will then perform interrater reliability analysis to examine the reliability of responses 
(James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). 
  
Propositions 
As presented in Figure 1, the following propositions are proposed: 
  
Figure 1 
Conceptual Model between Board Structure, Board Processes and Board 
Performance 
 
Board structure --> board processes. Under the agency theory, it is argued that CEO-
chairman duality is detrimental to companies as the same person will be marking his 
"own examination papers". There should be separation of duties between the top man of a 
company and the top man of the board so that each could monitor one another. As argued 
by Zahra and Pearce (1989), the lack of board process within boards is because the 
majority of boards have chairs who also serve as the CEOs. This makes it difficult for 
boards to perform their functions. Hence, being the same person in control of both the 
board and the company, it can be expected that CEO-chairman duality will lead to (1) 
lower level of effort norms; (2) lower level of cognitive conflicts; (3) lower level of 
affective conflict; (4) lower level of process conflict; (5) lower presence and usage of 
knowledge and skills and (6) higher level of cohesiveness within the board. The 
hypothesis is thus: 
Proposition 1: CEO-chairman duality leads to lower level of effort norms, lower level of 
cognitive conflicts, lower level of affective conflict, lower level of process conflicts, lower 
presence/usage of knowledge/skills and higher level of cohesiveness. 
Similarly, agency proponents put forth that outsider directors are more likely to show 
objectivity in their deliberations and are willing to consider diverse groups in making 
their decisions. Because of diversity, it may be possible that there could be a higher level 
of affective conflicts and lower level of cohesiveness within the board. Similarly, as 
outside directors do not meet as often as inside directors, some procedures for task will be 
confusing and hence there could be a higher level of process conflicts. On the other hand, 
with outsiders on the board, task performance issues become more urgent and hence a 
higher level of cognitive conflict may result accordingly. In the same manner, a higher 
level of effort norms will occur as members are forced to do a better job with the 
presence of diverse personality and backgrounds of different members. 
Strategic choice proponents also argued that outsiders will bring in more skills and 
knowledge to the company. The presence of a majority of outsiders is thus presumed to 
be more conducive to debate and discussion of a firm's mission, goals, and appropriate 
strategy. Such debates enlarge the basis of expertise, force management to consider a 
wider range of options and clarify constraints within each strategy implementation. As 
argued by Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000), outside directors bring with them a 
different set of skills and knowledge to the firm. With a higher proportion of outside 
directors, there would accordingly exist a larger percentage of business experts (e.g. 
directors of other firms), support specialists (e.g. lawyers and bankers) and community 
influentials (e.g. political leaders and university professors) in the firm. In other words, a 
larger proportion of outsiders in a company is likely to imply higher presence/usage of 
knowledge/skills. The propositions are: 
Proposition 2: A higher proportion of outside directors leads to lower level of 
cohesiveness. 
Proposition 3: A higher proportion of outside directors leads to higher level of effort 
norms, higher level of cognitive conflicts, higher level of affective conflict, higher level of 
process conflicts and higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills. 
Board processes --> board performance. A strengthening of effort norms will make 
directors more aware and willing to monitor the performance of the board/company. 
Similarly, a higher level of cognitive conflicts, which are task-oriented, will likely to 
make directors to perform the three roles of monitoring, service and strategy better. 
On the other hand, affective conflict, due to interpersonal differences, and process 
conflicts, due to discord over task allocations, can be expected to be dysfunctional. 
Consequently, board ability to perform their roles may be met with obstacles. With more 
skills and knowledge within the board, there should be more service and strategic 
planning outcomes arising from board activities. A cohesive board will also lead to a 
higher level of service and strategy for the company. Hence, we propose that 
Proposition 4: A higher level of effort norms leads to higher level of monitoring. 
Proposition 5: A higher level of cognitive conflicts leads to higher level of monitoring, 
service and strategy. 
Proposition 6: A higher level of affective conflicts leads to lower level of monitoring, 
service and strategy. 
Proposition 7: A higher level of process conflicts leads to lower level of monitoring, 
service and strategy. 
Proposition 8: A higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills leads to higher level of 
service and strategy. 
Proposition 9: A higher level of cohesiveness leads to higher level of service and 
strategy. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Past literature on board research has centred around board structure and company 
performance. Over the years, empirical studies do not reveal a conclusive relationship 
between these two variables (Dalton & Daily 1999). As a result, exploration for new 
areas of research on boards is much needed (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996; Pettigrew, 1992). 
Until lately, the literature on board processes is lacking. The reason for insufficient 
empirical work on board processes is possibly due to the difficulty of gaining access to 
boards. On the other hand, we believe that such a limitation should not be an excuse for 
not developing a working model for conceptual analysis. In this paper, we propose a 
conceptual model and show a working example of various constructs. 
We have developed a new conceptual model to study the relationship between board 
structure and board performance, with board processes as the intervening variable. 
Empirical work is needed to test and verify such a model. 
A basic premise of our model is that whether and how a board works or otherwise is 
more important than simply focusing on what the board structure is. While it can be 
argued that our conceptual model is grounded in the study of group effectiveness (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999), we do not measure performance in a vacuum. Based on the extensive 
review on boards' roles by Ong & Lee (2000), we contend that different dimensions of 
board processes will affect different performance outcomes. For the latter, three board 
functions are put forth for investigation: monitoring, service and strategy. 
Secondly, since company board is essentially a group phenomenon, we expect group 
dynamics, as a process variable, to be of critical importance. In this paper, we have 
identified four dimensions of board processes - effort norms, conflict (which we 
subdivide into cognitive, affective and process) , skills and knowledge of directors, and 
cohesiveness. Of related interest is research in top management teams (TMTs). Very 
similar to boards, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) denoted three central conceptual 
elements of TMT: composition, structure and process. TMT composition deals with the 
degree of heterogeneity of members; structure deals with roles of members and 
relationships among these roles; while process concerns social integration and the level of 
consensus among members. The use of group dynamics in studying board processes 
could further provide a new avenue for more research agendas. 
Finally, on a more practical note, understanding the different dimensions of board 
processes could lead to better utility of boards to maximize their contributions. To the 
shareholders at large, they might be eager to know how the dynamics of board processes 
impact on board and hence company performance. 
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